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Abstract
The selling prices of used houses may not fully reflect the maintenance spending of
current owners when prospective buyers are unable to conduct a thorough inspection of
houses offered for resale. This paper investigates how this resale externality problem
affects the maintenance expenditures of homeowners. After considering both observable
and unobservable repair expenses, the analysis shows that the resale externality reduces
not only maintenance expenditures, but also household mobility. A treatment effects
model is used to estimate the simultaneous relationship between mobility and maintenance
in the Japanese resale housing market. The results indicate that the resale externality
has a significant negative impact on maintenance expenditures.
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1 Introduction
Prospective buyers of used houses cannot fully observe how home-sellers renovate and repair
dwellings during their period of ownership. As a result, problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard arise.1
Chinloy (1978) examines theoretically and empirically an adverse selection problem in
the resale housing market. Chinloy (1978) shows that resale prices decline with time due to
an increase in the population of “lemons” (i.e. houses that have been poorly maintained).
Ultimately, all resale prices will approximate those of lemons and lemons will dominate the
resale market. Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) examine the moral hazard problem faced
by homeowners. Because prospective buyers are unable to conduct a perfect examination of
homes offered for sale, the selling prices of used houses do not fully reflect the current owner’s
repair expenses. Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) refer to this as a resale externality.
In turn, this externality creates a moral hazard: seller-owners do not attempt to repair any
damage to the house. Using maintenance expenditures data from the American Housing
Survey (AHS), Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) attempt to find evidence of the resale
externality. They hypothesize that the maintenance expenditures of homeowners who are
planning to move and sell their dwellings are lower than those of homeowners who choose
to stay because of the resale externality. However, no evidence was found of the resale
externality.2 Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) argue this is because the observable and
cosmetic repairs required to mask serious housing problems outweigh the unobservable and
substantial maintenance requirements.
Ben-Shahar (2004) argues that while the quality of housing is not perfectly observable,
improvement and maintenance are verifiable. Thus, investing in improvement and mainte-
nance before sale becomes a signal for better quality. In contrast to the literature discussed
above, Ben-Shahar (2004) shows that excessive maintenance spending occurs to reduce the
1Knight, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) show that if the buyer requires, as part of the purchase agreement, the
seller to make the repairs necessary to bring the house to a normal level of maintenance, the seller maintains
the house before closing. In this case, the selling price represents the value of a normally maintained home.
This is empirically proven with residential brokerage firm data from Stockton, California.
2While Boehm and Ihlanfeldt (1986) do not consider the resale externality, they also estimate the rela-
tionship between home improvement expenditures and predicted mobility. The coefficient of mobility in their
model is insignificant with a positive sign, as in Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000).
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adverse selection problem. Accordingly, in practice both observable and unobservable forms
of maintenance exist. Thus, we consider both observable and unobservable maintenance in
the theoretical section, and examine the effects of the resale externality on these two types of
maintenance.
One consideration, however, is that Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) do not consider
the moving decisions of homeowners. In contrast, Montgomery (1992) and Shear (1983)
examine a utility maximization model where homeowners simultaneously decide to move
and improve.3 Their model has a two-period structure, with second-period effects of the sale
price on households’ move and renovate decisions.4 They do not, however, deal with the resale
externality. Because asymmetric information on maintenance may reduce the selling price in
the used housing market, the resale externality is likely to have an impact on the mobility of
homeowners. Thus, we are concerned with the effects of households’ decision-making on their
mobility under the resale externality.
Using the Japanese Housing Demand Survey (JHDS), this paper empirically examines
these issues. This is especially important since problems with asymmetric information in the
Japanese resale housing market are likely to be more acute than in, say, the U.S. According to
the White Paper on Land, Infrastructure and Transportation in Japan (2003), the percentage
of existing home sales in relation to overall home sales (overall home sales represent the total
of new housing starts and existing home sales) is 76.1% in the U.S., 88.2% in the U.K.,
71.4% in France, and just 11.8% in Japan. These figures suggest that the Japanese market
is a more suitable context than the U.S. to examine resale externalities. Unfortunately, we
cannot separate observable and unobservable maintenance. Thus, we use total maintenance
expenditures as in previous studies.5 To measure the effect of the resale externality on housing
maintenance, we follow the approach taken by Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000).
In addition, we consider the self-selection bias of the dummy variable indicating imminent
sale. Employing the U.S. Annual Housing Survey, Shear (1983) uses a multinomial logistic
3Prospective home-buyers also have an option to improve their used house after purchase (Littlewood and
Munro, 1997). However, we are not concerned with this.
4Rosen and Smith (1986) construct an aggregate model of sales and renovation activity based on the
adjustment choice decision of homeowners to alter their housing consumption by moving or improving.
5Bogdon (1996) hypothesizes that there are differences in the determinants of the various categories of ren-
ovation and repair. Therefore, she estimates the determinants of renovation and repair expenditures separately
for each of the nine different categories provided by the AHS.
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analysis to estimate the simultaneous relationship between housing maintenance and moving
behavior. With the same data, Montgomery (1992) employs the Heckman two-stage method
to control selectivity bias: the first stage estimates an ordered probit model where the home-
owners’ choices are defined as moving, doing nothing, and improving, and the second stage
estimates an improvement expenditure equation. We apply the treatment effects model using
full maximum likelihood.6 This model considers the endogenous problem of the homeowner’s
decision whether to move and sell the current dwelling in the future and maintenance ex-
penditure. We include the estimated selling price deducted from the actual purchase price to
measure the effect of the resale externality on household mobility.7 In addition, we obtain two
types of alteration of existing housing units from the JHDS: one is rebuild, the other, remodel.
We assume that remodeling is more likely to include observable maintenance than rebuilding,
and use a bivariate probit model to examine the choice between resale of the current dwelling
in the future and remodeling on the type of maintenance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model
where homeowners choose either to move and resell the current dwelling or stay, making an
optimal choice of maintenance expenditures under the resale externality. The data and empir-
ical model are described in Section 3, along with the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes
the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a two-period model. In period 1, individuals choose the level of housing stock,
the total maintenance expenditures M , and the composite good, x. Because we focus on
maintenance spending, we assume that housing comprises a single unit. We assume that
repair work, which an owner performs, is completed at the end of period 1. Thus, the current
level of maintenance does not affect housing wealth in period 1. The budget constraint of
homeowners in period 1 is then y = x + p −M , where y is the first-period income and p is
the purchase price of the single unit of housing wealth.
6Green (2003) provides further detail concerning the treatment effects model.
7The White Paper of Construction in Japan (1996) shows that 8.1% of owner-occupied households move
each year in the U.S., whereas only 1.8% do so in Japan. Yamazaki (1999) suggests that this difference occurs
because information on maintenance records is not well prepared in Japan. Hence, homeowner’s efforts in
housing maintenance do not impact on the selling price, and consequently, owner mobility is reduced.
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Assume that the present value of housing wealth (w) in period 2 depends on maintenance
expenditures undertaken in period 1. Furthermore, housing wealth is assumed to be a function
of two types of variables: o and u, where M ≡ o+u. The variable o represents observable (and
verifiable) maintenance expenditures and the variable u represents unobservable maintenance
expenditures.8 Thus, housing wealth can be written as w = w(o, u). We assume that both
arguments increase housing wealth value at a decreasing rate. Thus wo > 0, woo < 0, wu > 0,
and wuu < 0. We denote the partial derivatives of w(o, u) with respect to its argument as the
marginal value. The sign of the cross-partial derivatives of w(o, u) is evaluated as follows. If
o and u are independent, then wou = 0. We refer to this as case I. If o and u are complements
(substitutes), then wou > 0 (< 0). Complements (substitutes) imply that a greater level
of one argument increases (decreases) the marginal value of the other. We refer to these
complements (substitutes) as case C (S).
Homeowners have two options in period 2: sell the housing or stay. Let us write the net
benefit of the former, Φ, and that of the latter, Ψ. Homeowners then choose the option that
generates the higher net benefit, i.e., max {Φ,Ψ}.
Suppose that a two-period utility function has a simple additive form. If the owner
continues to dwell in the same housing, then he or she obtains:9
Ψ = x+ w(o, u) + ψ,
where ψ is the pecuniary (present) value of utility they can gain at his or her present location.10
After substituting for x using the budget constraint in period 1, we have
Ψ = y − p− o− u+ w(o, u) + ψ. (1)
8The Housing Performance Indication System was established in 2000 by the Organization for Housing
Warranty for the purpose of securing and enhancing the quality of dwellings. Initially, this was restricted to
new residential housing, but was extended to existing houses in 2002. The performance indicators contained
in this provision for newly-built houses include nine criteria or fields ((1) structural performance, (2) fire
safety, (3) durability, (4) ease of maintenance and management, (5) energy efficiency, (6) air quality, (7) ratio
of exterior openings to total wall area, (8) noise transmission, and (9) barrier free design) across 29 items.
However, there are only 21 items in six fields that can be established for used houses because they cannot be
inspected after construction. In addition, if the house did not have a warranty at the start of occupation, the
number is further reduced to five fields with 12 items. Put simply, 17 of the total 29 items cannot be fully
inspected for a house offered for resale.
9We do not include mortgage debt due to data limitations. In the U.S., Harding, Miceli, and Sirmans
(2000) show that the risk of mortgage default, coupled with limited liability, creates a disincentive to optimally
maintain the dwelling.
10We suppress housing stock as with Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000), and simply write the utility from
housing as w(o, u).
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When the owner chooses to move, we assume he or she sells the house in the used houing
market. Resale externality problems, however, arise in the secondary market because prospec-
tive buyers of the house may have imperfect information about maintenance. As a result,
the selling price of the used house does not fully reflect the previous owner’s maintenance
efforts. To introduce this in our model, we assume the following: the owner believes that
buyers underestimate the input level of u just 1α (α > 1) due to the resale externality. Thus,
if the owner resells a house, he or she obtains:
Φ = y − p− o− u+ w(o, v) + φ, (2)
where v ≡ 1αu and φ is the pecuniary (present) value they can gain at a new location. Eq.
(2) implies that the owner obtains only w (o, v) because u is unobservable.
The optimal conditions for o and u in (1) become:
wo = 1,
wu = 1.
The equilibrium investment levels are denoted by o∗ and u∗.11
The optimal conditions for (2) become:
wo = 1, (3)
1
α
wv = 1. (4)
We denote the equilibrium input levels in this case as oR and uR.
The equilibrium investment levels are the same while u is observable . That is, o∗ = oR
and u∗ = uR if α = 1. Thus α > 1 shows the effect of the resale externality. Differentiating
equations (3) and (4) with respect to α, and applying Cramer’s rule yields the following:
∆
do
dα
= − 1
α
wvwov, (5)
∆
du
dα
= v
[(
1
ηvv
+ 1
)
woowvv − w2ov
]
, (6)
11We assume that an interior solution exists for the first-order conditions. This is assumed to hold throughout
the analysis. Thus, in our model homeowners choose some positive amount of maintenance. As an alternative,
Montgomery (1992) uses the discontinuity and nonconvexity of the budget constraint to develop a model in
which homeowners can choose not to make improvements.
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where ∆ ≡ woowvv − w2ov and ηvv ≡ vwvvwv . The notation ηvv indicates the input elasticity of
the marginal value losses, i.e., the percentage change in the marginal value on v in response
to a given percentage change in the input v, the sign of which is negative. The notation ∆ is
positive because we suppose that the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied. Eqs.
(5) and (6) yield the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the owner resells the house, the resale externality yields (i) o∗ = oR
in case I, o∗ > oR in case C, and o∗ < oR in case S, and (ii) if ηvv ∈ (−1, 0), then u∗ > uR
in case I, and if ηvv ∈ (−woowvv∆ , 0), then u∗ > uR in both case C and case S.
In their empirical analysis, Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) suggest that sellers have
a tendency to make observable cosmetic repairs. However, the results of over-maintenance
cannot be derived from their theoretical model because it only considers unobservable inputs.
In contrast to their model, our model can derive over-maintenance on o (o∗ < oR) when o
and u are substitutes. Our model also deals with the problem of under-maintenance on u
(u∗ > uR) due to the resale externality, as shown by Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000).
Next, let us examine the effect of the resale externality on total maintenance expenditures
M (M ≡ o+ u). This is represented by
dM
dα
=
do
dα
+
du
dα
. (7)
If dudα < 0, then the resale externality reduces total maintenance expenditures in case I (
do
dα = 0)
and case C ( dodα < 0). Suppose case S (wov < 0). In this case, o is larger than optimal level
in equilibrium, i.e., dodα > 0. Thus the resale externality has an ambiguous impact on total
maintenance expenditures. Note that 1αwv = wo in equilibrium from the first-order conditions
(3) and (4). Substituting this relation, (5), and (6) into the right-hand side in (7), we have
the following:
∆
dM
dα
= v
[(
1
ηvv
+ 1
)
woowvv −
(
1
ηov
+ 1
)
w2ov
]
, (8)
where ηov is the cross-input elasticity of the marginal value, defined as ηov ≡ vwovwo . The
sign of ηov is negative in case S. If the right-hand side in (8) becomes negative, then we can
conclude that total maintenance expenditures are reduced due to the resale externality, even
in case S. Thus, we have the following:
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Lemma 1 If ηvv ∈ (−woowvvΛ , 0), then the resale externality yields under-investment on total
maintenance expenditures even in case S, where Λ = ∆− w2ovηov .
Lemma 1 implies that dMdα is more likely to be negative when ηvv is less likely to be elastic
(ηov is more likely to be elastic). To interrupt lemma 1 more intuitively, let us restrict the
interval of ηvv and ηov. Suppose ηov = −1. Then, to satisfy the condition on lemma 1,
ηvv ∈ (−1, 0). The resale externality increase the marginal products (wv) because it evaluates
u at a lower point: the resale externality lowers u just 1α . This works at the direction where
the amount of the u is increased. Inelasticity of ηvv, however, implies this effect is small.
Thus under-maintenance on u occurs in this case, and consequently the sign of dMdα becomes
negative under ηov = −1. Suppose next ηvv = −1. Then, to satisfy the condition on lemma
1, ηov < −1. Elastic ηov implies that when the owner increases o, the loss from investment on
u becomes large. This induces large under-maintenance on u, and as a consequence in this
case, the level of under-investment on u outweighs over-investment on o.
The efficient transfer condition depends on Φ and Ψ. If Φ is larger than Ψ, the owner
decides to move and sell the house. Otherwise, the owner remains. The efficient transfer con-
dition does not depend on the value of housing w if α = 1. Because parameter α has an impact
on Φ, α > 1 shows the effect of the resale externality on owners’ mobility. Differentiating Φ
with respect to α and using (3) and (4) we have:
dΦ
dα
= −v. (9)
This implies that the resale externality reduces the gains from transfer, from which we obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The probability of transfer decreases under the resale externality.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 The Data
We use the 2003 Japanese Housing Demand Survey (the JHDS) data to test the model.
Conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport every five years,
the JHDS collects micro-level cross-sectional data on 100,000 households. In practice, we
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cannot directly estimate o and u. However, the JHDS does ask households to report total
maintenance expenditures M made in the last five years 1999–2003. We use only those
households that respond to this question. Moreover, we limit the sample to single-family
detached owner-occupied housing, because condominiums and apartment buildings have the
potential to create a free-rider problem in the sense that owners have an incentive to under-
maintain common areas. Screening the data for complete information on the selected variables
produces a sample of 3,195 observations of homeowner expenditures on maintenance.
3.2 Empirical Model of Maintenance Expenditures
We follow the approach taken by Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) to capture the effect
of the resale externality on maintenance. That is, we estimate the following maintenance
expenditures equation for the homeowner i:
Mi = Xib+ aRi + ei, (10)
where Xi are housing and household trait vectors, Ri is the indicator of imminent sale and
takes the value of one if the homeowner intends to sell the current dwelling (hereafter resale
dummy), b and a are coefficients, and ei is the error term.12 In the sample, 45 households
responded that they would resell their dwelling in the future. The sign of a captures the
impact of the resale externality. The predicted sign is ambiguous, because over-maintenance
on o occurs in case S. The sign becomes negative, however, when ηvv is more likely to be
inelastic (ηov is more likely to be elastic) even in case S from lemma 1.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables included in Xi. We use the
size of the structure (site area measured by square meter, lot size, and number of rooms,
room), the year when the dwelling was built, construction year, and construction material,
for housing characteristics. Note that if a house was extended or rebuilt, and if the new
floor space was more than half of the total floor space of the house following extension or
rebuilding, the construction year equates to the extension or rebuilding year in the JHDS.
Construction material is classified into the following three categories: buildings whose main
12Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) include zero maintenance expenditures, and use both OLS and Tobit as
estimation methods. Because the JHDS is cross-sectional data, in our model maintenance expenditures before
1999 are zero, even if investment actually takes place. Thus, only homeowners with nonzero maintenance
expenditures are included in the sample.
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frames are made of wood (this is the reference group); buildings whose main frames are made
of ferroconcrete and steel ferroconcrete; steel reinforced concrete (SRC); and others. We
also include as homeowner characteristics the total annual income before tax earned by all
household members (income), the number of household members (household size), the age
of the household head (age), and the year of relocation to the present dwelling (move-in
year). Maintenance, lot size, member, and age are continuous variables. In the estimation
stage, we take the natural logarithmic transformation for these variables. Construction year,
income, and move-in year are classified into 13 different categories in the JHDS, from 1 (the
oldest or the lowest) to 13 (the latest or the highest). We add these in ascending order to the
explanatory variables in Eq. (10). Three geographical categories are included, comprising:
twenty-three Tokyo wards (Tokyo); twelve major cities outside Tokyo (large city); and all
other areas (reference).
Importantly, Ri (the resale dummy) is endogenous because households decide whether
or not they will move and sell. Hence, we employ the treatment effects model using full
maximum likelihood to control for this self-selection bias. Moreover, from (9) or Proposition
2, the resale externality reduces household mobility because it lowers the price of a used house.
Thus, transfer and resale depend on the expected price of housing when the owner-occupier
intends to sell. To estimate the predicted value of a house if it were sold on the resale housing
market, we employ a hedonic price of a single-family used house purchased in the period
1999–2003 drawn from the JHDS (314 households in the sample). Let Wj be the price paid
on a used house with housing characteristics Hj , and γˆ is the OLS estimated coefficient from
Wj = Hjγ.13 Then Wˆi = Hiγˆ gives the predicted price if the house were sold in the resale
housing market.
We estimate a following specification for resale choice:
R∗i = Ziβ + δWˆi + εi, (11)
Ri = 1 if R∗i > 0,
where R∗i is an unobserved latent variable, Zi is household trait vectors, β and δ are coeffi-
13We specify a log-linear model with the natural log of the purchase price. The variables include lot size,
room, construction year, construction material, commuting distance, the presence of insulated window sashes,
the condition of inclination, whether the dwelling has been made barrier-free out of consideration for the
elderly, and geographical dummy variables.
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cients, and εi is the error term. We expect that the resale externality lowers the price of a
used house, and consequently reduces household mobility. Thus, we expect R∗i to be positively
related to the predicted price. The degree of dissatisfaction of the dwelling (DS dwelling)
and neighborhood (DS neighborhood) are included in Zi. The JHDS asks households to
report their degree of satisfaction with the dwelling and neighborhood. Their responses are
classified into 4 different categories: 1. satisfied, 2. fairly satisfied, 3. fairly dissatisfied, and
4. very dissatisfied: the larger the number, the greater the degree of dissatisfaction. We add
this ascending index to the explanatory variables when we estimate (11). We expect R∗i to
be positively related to the degree of dissatisfaction.
The distribution of (εi, ei) is assumed to be bivariate normal, with [0, 0, 1, σe, ρ]. The
correlation ρ becomes nonzero when εi and ei are correlated.
3.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 reports the empirical results. Before discussing the effect of the resale externality
on the simultaneous relationship between household mobility and maintenance expenditures,
we briefly refer to another control variable. Lot size and room have a statistically positive
significant on maintenance expenditures, i.e., a larger dwelling requires more maintenance.
As expected, the degrees of dissatisfaction with the dwelling and neighborhood have a sta-
tistically significant positive impact on imminent sale. High income homeowners spend more
on maintenance, and are more likely to move and sell their dwelling. In contrast, house-
holds with more members spend less on maintenance, and are less likely to move and sell
the dwelling. The longer a household has occupied its current dwelling, the more it spends
on housing maintenance, and the less likely to sell. The former result is inconsistent with
Montgomery (1992). Homeowners with longer duration of occupation are less likely to face
the resale externality problem, and consequently they obtain the true benefit from their main-
tenance expenditures. Thus, maintenance expenditure in our model increases with duration.
Construction year has a positive and significant coefficient in the maintenance expenditures
equation. This implies that homeowners with older houses spend less on housing mainte-
nance. The result lies at odds with the results presented in Harding, Miceli and Sirmans
(2000), and Montgomery (1992). This may be because the definitions of construction year
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differ between the JHDS and the AHS. As discussed, the year of construction in the JHDS
can change following extensive renovation. The age, construction material and geographical
dummies are all insignificant.
We find that the predicted price is positively related to mobility. Because the resale
externality lowers the selling price of the used house, household mobility would be lowered
by the resale externality. However, the coefficient is insignificant.
The hypothesis that selection bias in not present (ρ = 0) is rejected at the 1% significance
level. As expected, there is correlation between mobility and maintenance expenditures. After
correction for selection bias, the resale dummy has a large significant negative impact on total
maintenance expenditures. Homeowners who intend to sell the current dwelling spent 75%
(exp(−1.39)− 1 = −0.75) less than those intending to remain in the dwelling. This suggests
that resale externalities cause serious damage to the used housing market in Japan.
3.4 Rebuilding and Remodeling
Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000) hypothesize that sellers have a tendency to make observ-
able cosmetic repairs. Our model also predicts this outcome. Unfortunately, the treatment
effects model presented in the previous section cannot capture this tendency. To capture this,
we estimate a bivariate probit model which takes into account the discrete choice of mainte-
nance activities. But as discussed, o and u cannot be gathered from the JHDS. The JHDS
does, however, ask households to choose one category from three different types of main-
tenance, i.e., extend, rebuild, and remodel, done in the past five years. Extend is work to
increase the floor area of an existing dwelling. Rebuild is work to demolish part of a dwelling,
and build again; e.g. rebuilding a kitchen, a toilet, and a bathroom. Remodel is work to
repair, change, or renovate an existing dwelling, including remodeling the interior and chang-
ing the roofing. All categories will include both u and m. We, however, suppose that both
extend and rebuild are more likely to include unobservable maintenance than remodeling.
In the estimation below, extend and rebuild observations are combined into a single cat-
egory. The dependent variable used in the probit analysis is a dummy variable set equal to
one if households choose to remodel (RM) and zero otherwise. In the sample, 34.5 percent
are rebuild decisions, and 65.5 percent are remodel decisions. We replace Eq. (10) with:
12
RM∗i = XiB +ARi + ξi, (12)
RMi = 1 if RM∗i > 0,
where RM∗i is an unobserved latent variable, B and A are coefficients, and ξi is the error term.
The sign of A captures the impact of the resale externality. The predicted sign is positive
when the rental externality has a tendency to make observable renovation. The distribution
of (εi, ξi) is assumed to be bivariate normal, with [0, 0, 1, 1, λ], where again εi is the error term
of Eq. (11), and λ is the correlation coefficient.
Table 3 shows the results. The hypothesis that selection bias in not present (λ = 0)
cannot be rejected in this case. We obtain a positive and significant effect of resale dummy.
This suggest that homeowners who intend to sell the dwelling in the future choose to remodel
(which is more likely to include observable maintenance than rebuild) than those who intend
to stay. This finding is consistent with Harding, Miceli and Sirmans (2000).
4 Conclusions
In the paper, we investigate the effect of the resale externality on mobility and maintenance
expenditures. Our main conclusions are as follows. In the theoretical part of the paper, we
develop a model in which homeowners invest both observable and unobservable maintenance
expenditures, and simultaneously choose whether to sell the dwelling or stay. We show that
the resale externality reduces total maintenance expenditures when the input elasticity of
marginal value is sufficiently small, because the under-maintenance of unobservable mainte-
nance in this case becomes large. We also show that the resale externality always reduces
mobility. In the empirical part of the paper, using data from the 2003 Housing Demand
Survey of Japan we use a treatment effects model that confirms these theoretical predictions.
After correcting for selection bias, we find that homeowners who intend to sell the dwelling
in the future spend 75% less than those who intend to stay. That is, evidence for a negative
resale externality exists in the Japanese used housing market. We also find that the resale
externality is likely to reduce mobility, but to an insignificant extent. In addition, using a
bivariate probit model we find that homeowners who are planning to sell the dwelling in the
13
future have a tendency to undertake observable maintenance in contrast to those planning to
stay.
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Table 1 Mean (Frequency/Mode) of variables
Variable Mean
Maintenance (10,000 yen) 483.0
% Resale 1.4
Lot size (m2) 533.8
Room 6.7
Construction year 1971–1980
% SRC 4.4
% Others 3.7
Income (10,000 yen) 500–600
Household size 3.7
Age 55.7
Move-in year 1971–1980
% Tokyo 1.6
% Large city 8.0
Number of observations 3,195
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Table 2 Maintenance expenditures and resale choice estimation results
Variable Coefficient Z-statistics
Maintenance expenditures
Intercept 2.61∗∗∗ 16.4
Resale −1.39∗∗∗ −5.2
Lot size 0.0004∗∗ 2.1
Room 0.08∗∗∗ 8.6
Construction year 0.05∗∗∗ 4.9
SRC 0.004 0.1
Others −0.06 −0.7
Income 0.03∗∗∗ 5.4
Household size −0.04∗∗∗ −3.0
Age 0.003 1.4
Move-in year −0.06∗∗∗ −5.4
Tokyo −0.01 −0.1
Large city 0.02 0.3
Resale choice
Intercept −4.68∗∗∗ −3.6
Predicted price 0.21 1.0
DS dwelling 0.37∗∗∗ 4.4
DS neighborhood 0.19∗∗ 2.3
Income 0.04∗∗ 2.1
Household size −0.13∗∗∗ −2.7
Age −0.01 −1.0
Move-in year 0.12∗∗∗ 3.6
ρ 0.56
σe 0.99
LR test (ρ = 0) 8.8
Log-likelihood −4, 656.3
Number of observations 3, 195
∗∗∗ indicates significant at 1%. ∗∗ indicates significant at 5%.
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Table 3 Remodel choice and resale choice estimation results
Variable Coefficient Z-statistics
Remodel choice
Intercept 0.64∗∗∗ 3.1
Resale 2.26∗∗∗ 4.0
Lot size −0.0004 −1.5
Room −0.04∗∗∗ −3.0
Construction year −0.05∗∗∗ −3.4
SRC 0.32∗∗∗ 2.6
Others 0.29∗∗ 2.2
Income 0.0002 0.02
Household size −0.09∗∗∗ −4.9
Age 0.01∗∗ 2.3
Move-in year 0.05∗∗∗ 3.3
Tokyo 0.17 0.9
Large city 0.18∗∗ 2.0
Resale choice
Intercept −4.90∗∗∗ −3.7
Predicted price 0.22 1.0
DS dwelling 0.35∗∗∗ 3.9
DS neighborhood 0.18∗∗ 2.1
Income 0.04∗ 1.9
Household size −0.16∗∗∗ −3.1
Age −0.003 −0.5
Move-in year 0.14∗∗∗ 3.8
λ −0.58
LR test (λ = 0) 1.9
Log-likelihood −2, 181.4
Number of observations 3, 195
∗∗∗ indicates significant at 1%. ∗∗ indicates significant at 5%.
∗ indicates significant at 10%.
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